

# Inequality and Stability

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**ABSTRACT.** – A constitution remains in force so long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstated as soon as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation. It is the rich, and not the poor segments of society who in our model pose the greater threat to the stability of the social order.

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## Inégalité et stabilité

**RÉSUMÉ.** – Une constitution restera en place aussi longtemps qu'aucune des parties ne désire choisir une situation non-coopérative et sera rétablie dès qu'il sera à nouveau dans l'intérêt de chaque partie de coopérer. Dans notre modèle ce sont les couches riches de la société et non les pauvres qui présentent le plus de danger pour la stabilité de l'ordre social.

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# 1 Introduction

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While the idea that political stability and the social order may depend on economic factors is not new, recent empirical findings and historical developments seem to have stimulated a renewed increased interest in this topic (e.g. ALESINA and RODRICK [1991]). Moreover, recent events in Europe also point to the influence of economic performance on the stability of the political and social order. While some countries, mainly for economic reasons, try to integrate into a bigger political and economic unit (e.g. entrance in the EEC), others instead look to secede from existing blocks (e.g. some Russian and Yugoslav republics).

We shall look at the stability of the constitutional order from this perspective. That is, we will examine the extent to which constitutional stability depends on fluctuations in the economic performance of the parties originally engaged in the constitutional contract. We adopt a contractarian view of the emergence of constitutions and social order. We follow BUCHANAN [1975] and assume that starting from some initial non-cooperative situation, the constitutional contract emerges as a Pareto improving move for rational utility maximizing parties. The initial pre-constitutional stage may be an anarchic or warfare setting in which case the constitutional contract essentially involves a disarmament agreement; gains from trade are then made possible to all parties through the elimination of socially wasteful outlays on defense and predation. Alternatively we may envisage the initial non-cooperative situation as one of autarky in which trade barriers exist between the parties (say, two countries), or, alternatively, a noncooperative situation in which resources are wasted on rent-seeking behavior. In this case, the constitutional contract involves the elimination of these barriers or wasteful expenditures, and integration into a larger unit, and efficiency gains stem from the abolition of protectionism or rent-seeking.

Clearly, the post-contract social order and the associated distribution of rights over goods will survive only so long as it represents a Pareto improvement over the noncooperative or autarkic situation. However, in a dynamic setting in which the post-contract economic situation of the parties is subject to shocks due to, say, output fluctuations, this Pareto superiority may be transitory. That is, some party might occasionally be better-off going it alone. It would then consider renegeing on its contractual obligations and, unless the contractual settlement is renegotiated or the costs of regime change are prohibitive, to revert to autarky. In any case, one would expect an increase in social and political instability under those circumstances.

This paper addresses the choice of an optimal constitution that defines an assignment of individual rights over goods when the stochastic effects that bear on the evolution of output are taken into account. The model also allows for the influence of shocks to outcomes that would alternatively prevail under noncooperation.

Our main finding is that a partnership of equals is easier to sustain than one whose members differ significantly in their market skills or in their ability to engage in rent-seeking or even predatory behavior. This is

because inequality creates a greater temptation for parties to renege on their contractual obligations. In this respect our conclusions agree with recent theoretical work by BENHABIB and RUSTICHINI [1991] and by PERSSON and TABELLINI [1991], but the reasons are quite different. In those two papers, it is the poorer social segments that pose the greater threat to social order by voting higher taxes or by direct expropriation from the rich. Moreover, neither paper deals with income fluctuations as a possible source of political instability. In our paper, on the other hand, it is the rich groups who may want to go it alone or more generally to find some nonconstitutional means (peaceful or otherwise) to prevent their income from being redistributed to the poor.

The main empirical implication of the model is that constitutional disruptions should be accompanied by increases in income inequality, while reversions to order should be accompanied by decreases in inequality. We test this implication by comparing cross-country data on inequality with the presence or absence of constitutional changes. Our results indicate that the model performs well, particularly in the case of disruptive constitutional changes which clearly go hand in hand with increases in inequality. However, while “non-disruptive” constitutional changes were found to lead to greater movements toward income equality than no constitutional changes, as would be predicted by our theory, these differences were not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the difference between the two samples experiencing major constitutional changes was in accordance with the theory and significant at a five percent confidence level.

## 2 A Diagrammatic Illustration

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We start with a diagrammatic illustration of the constitutional problem we intend to discuss in a two-person setting. Figure 1 depicts two utility possibility frontiers. The inner locus is the possibility frontier under noncooperation while the outer locus is the frontier attainable through cooperation. Let  $N$  be some initial allocation of utilities that reflects the noncooperative access to goods and the effort spent in getting them. The two individuals may differ not only in their productive efficiencies, but also in their rent-seeking abilities and even their aggressiveness or physical strength, all of which will influence where on the inner locus  $N$  will be located. Point  $N$  therefore reflects the “natural distribution” which will arise under noncooperation <sup>1</sup>.

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1. For a more complete characterization of this concept see BUSH (1972) and BUCHANAN (1975), and for a treatment that emphasizes players’ aggressiveness, see JOHANSEN (1982).




FIGURE 1

*The “Natural Distribution” and the “Direct Production Position”.*

From this initial equilibrium both parties may find that they would be better-off if an agreement were reached. The outer locus describes the opportunity set under cooperation. On this locus, point  $Y$  represents the “direct production” position, *i.e.*, the position attained when each individual keeps all that he produces<sup>2</sup>. As illustrated in the diagram, this position need not fall within the region that Pareto dominates the point  $N$ . For instance, individual 1 may be a relatively inefficient producer under peace but has a comparative advantage over individual 2 because of superior bargaining power or superior rent-seeking abilities that he can use under noncooperation. If such a situation occurs, the constitutional agreement, if it is to emerge at all, must be accompanied by a transfer of goods from 2 to 1. In other words, the constitutional contract, understood here as a mutually agreed on assignment of property rights over goods, must result in a redistribution of goods. Point  $\theta Y$  indicates a possible post constitutional situation once this redistribution has taken place. Both individuals recognize in  $\theta Y$  that they are better off under the constitutional order.

Now allow for the passage of time. Suppose, first, that the “natural distribution”,  $N$ , upon which the constitutional agreement was settled evolves dynamically. Specifically, assume that the individuals’ rent-seeking capacities that determine their relative efficiency under noncooperation, change through time in response to some shock. Point  $N'$  illustrates a new underlying “natural distribution” reflecting a relative deterioration in individual 2’s rent-seeking capacities. The previous constitutional order

2. We again borrow the terminology of BUCHANAN (1975).

position,  $\theta Y$ , is now no longer Pareto superior to the underlying “natural distribution”. Unless there is a reassignment of property rights over goods, individual 1 has an incentive to defect and secure point  $N'$  where he is better-off.

Returning to the initial constitutional agreement, consider next the case where there the change is not in the “natural distribution”, but in the “direct production” position. That is, suppose that the output obtainable by each individual under cooperation is subject to exogenous shocks. As output fluctuates through time in response to these shocks, the new post-constitutional position may fall outside the Pareto superior region corresponding to point  $N$ . This possibility is illustrated by the point  $\theta Y'$  in the diagram, where we have assumed that the output of individual 2 has experienced a substantial adverse shock. Again we have a situation here where incentives exist (this time on the part of individual 2) to renegotiate the original constitutional contract. In sum, the two types of shock can cause the post-constitutional situation to move outside the region that Pareto dominates the underlying “natural distribution”. In such circumstances, as the latter no longer gives support to the agreed-upon distribution of property rights over goods, one would expect an increased instability in the social order.

**A Rigid Social Contract:** Figure 1 also makes it clear that regardless of the position of  $N$  and  $Y$ , the region that is Pareto superior to the point  $N$  is never empty, so that a sufficiently flexible redistributive mechanism would always be able to induce everyone to cooperate by giving them an allocation on the outer curve. That is, a social contract that stipulates a redistributive policy that is optimal under each possible contingency would in our model ensure continuous social order.

It is, of course, quite impossible for the social contract to envisage every contingency, just as it is impossible for private contracts to do so, as they would if markets were complete. This is why societies have judicial systems that interpret the law. But even there, the outcome will often be controversial and imperfect. As HART (1961, p. 125) argues in the legal literature:

“It is a feature of the human predicament (and so the legislative one) that we labor under two connected handicaps whenever we seek to regulate, unambiguously and in advance, some sphere of conduct by means of general standards to be used without further official direction on particular occasions. The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact; the second is our relative indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite number of features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine were known to us, then provision could be made in advance for every possibility. We could make rules, the application of which to particular cases never called for a further choice. Everything could be known, and for everything, since it could be known, something could be done and specified in advance by a rule. This would be a world fit ‘mechanical’ jurisprudence.”

A similar view has been put forth in the economics literature; when a decision maker can not calculate the optimal policy for a difficult problem, he will, it is argued, use a simpler rule. As HEINER (1983, p. 585) puts it,

“... agents cannot decipher all of the complexity of the decision problems they face, which literally prevents them from selecting the most preferred alternative. Consequently, the flexibility of behavior to react to information is constrained to smaller behavioral repertoires than can be reasonably administered. Numerous deviations from the resulting behavior patterns are actually superior in certain situations, but they are still ignored because of uncertainty about when to deviate from these regularities.”

And in his review of Rawls’s book, Arrow (1973, p. 263) writes :

“To the extent that individuals are really individual, each an autonomous end in himself, ... there cannot be any rule that is completely acceptable to all. There must ... be the possibility of unadjudicable conflict, which may show itself logically as paradoxes in the process of social decision-making.”

The modern literature on contracting has also pointed out that completely contingent contracts are not seen in practice because of the enormous costs that accompany the specification and state-verification of such detailed contracts (WILLIAMSON [1975], DYE [1985]). It thus seems reasonable to assume that the constitutional framers can not foresee every contingency, or even to set up a rule that will best deal with each unforeseen contingency. And so, it may be appropriate to view a constitution as a collection of rules that some group or other may periodically decide to break <sup>3</sup>. This is how we shall look at it in this paper. The next section focuses on the choice of the optimal redistribution to be effected at the constitutional stage under this stochastic environment. Specifically, it analyzes the optimization problem of the constitutional decision-makers who take into account the effect of both types of shocks and who attempt to minimize the instability of the social order.

### 3 The Model

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Consider an environment in which individuals do not need to spend resources on warfare or on rent-seeking activities, so that they can keep all they produce. Let  $Y_1$  and  $Y_2$  be the output accruing to individual 1 and 2 under these circumstances, circumstances that we call the direct production position. We assume that output evolves as follows: <sup>4</sup>

$$(1) \quad Y_i = a_i + \lambda_i Y_{i,-1} + v_i \quad 0 < \lambda_i < 1, \quad i = 1, 2.$$

For both individuals output varies through time in response to shocks  $v_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$  and exhibits persistence or serial correlation through the

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3. The Civil War, the result of the South’s cession from the Union is the only U.S. instance of such a phenomenon. But it is now manifesting itself in many other places.

4. Time subscripts are eliminated whenever there is no ambiguity. The treatment will be abstract, so the identity of the parties is not made explicit – they might be different ethnic groups, or they might be the government, unions, trade associations, the military, and so on.

parameters  $\lambda_i$ . The shocks  $v_i$  are themselves assumed to be mutually and serially uncorrelated.

Under war the output vector  $(Y_1, Y_2)$  is not obtainable as both individuals spend resources in defense and predation. Let  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  denote the cost of the war effort to individuals 1 and 2. We assume that

$$(2) \quad C_1 = c - \varepsilon, \quad \text{and} \quad C_2 = c + \varepsilon,$$

where  $c < 0$  is a constant, and  $\varepsilon$  represents the individuals' relative efficiency in rent-seeking under noncooperation. If  $\varepsilon > 0$ , individual 1 is better (*i.e.* has a lower cost) at this activity than individual 2 is<sup>5</sup>. Over time,  $\varepsilon$  evolves as follows:

$$(3) \quad \varepsilon = \rho\varepsilon_{-1} + u, \quad 0 \leq \rho < 1,$$

where the white noise shock  $u$  follows  $u \sim N(\bar{u}, \sigma_u^2)$ . Some inertia therefore enters the evolution of these attributes. Note that if the mean value  $\bar{u}$  differs from zero, say  $\bar{u} > 0$ , individual 1 has a long-run advantage over individual 2. We assume that  $|\bar{u}/(1 - \rho)| < c$  to assure that in the long-run noncooperation is costly to both individuals.

In view of (2) the net noncooperative output, termed the ‘‘natural distribution’’, is

$$(4) \quad Z_1 = Y_1 - C_1, \quad \text{and} \quad Z_2 = Y_2 - C_2.$$

This natural distribution is the starting basis upon which individuals evaluate the potential benefits of a constitutional agreement.

Once in place, the constitutional contract introduces social order into the community as a result of the mutual recognition and acceptance by both individuals of certain property rights on goods produced. We thus assume that, under constitutional order, individuals 1 and 2 get

$$(5) \quad Z_1 = \theta(Y_1 + Y_2), \quad \text{and} \quad Z_2 = (1 - \theta)(Y_1 + Y_2).$$

The redistributive parameter  $\theta$  assigns a fixed share of total output to each individual. Its introduction is needed for two reasons. First, the ‘‘direct production’’ situation described by (1) and (2) may not Pareto dominate the ‘‘natural distribution’’. This possibility, which we illustrated in Figure 1, may result if for instance one individual, say 1, is relatively very efficient as a rent-seeker so that  $\varepsilon > c$ <sup>6</sup>. Second, even if the ‘‘direct production’’ is Pareto superior to the ‘‘natural distribution’’ the parameter  $\theta$  allows for choosing among the many alternative Pareto efficient positions.

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5. One may think of  $C_1 + C_2$  as the ‘‘peace dividend’’.

6. This possibility is explicitly discussed by BUCHANAN (1975): ‘‘Some ‘redistribution’ of goods or endowments may have to take place before a sufficiently acceptable base for property claims can be established... Once any of these transfers takes place, if one is required, and/or behavioral limits are mutually accepted, positive rights of persons in stocks of goods or in resource endowments capable of producing goods may be settled’’ (p. 64).

We can now formulate the optimization problem faced by the constitutional framers. A Buchanan-Rawls perspective of constitutional design suggests that a representative constitutional decision-maker would choose  $\theta$  optimally without knowing which particular position he will occupy in the social setting, *i.e.*, without knowing whether he will be individual 1 or individual 2. And if each generation is to receive the same weight in the social welfare function, this suggests that undiscounted, long-run average utility be maximized. Therefore, under this “veil of ignorance”<sup>7</sup> and assuming constant marginal utility of income<sup>8</sup>, the constitutional designer will choose  $\theta$  to maximize expected total long-run output  $E(Z_1 + Z_2)$ , where

$$Z_1 + Z_2 = \begin{cases} Y_1 + Y_2 & \text{under cooperation} \\ Y_1 + Y_2 - 2c & \text{under noncooperation,} \end{cases}$$

and where the expectation is with respect to the steady-state long-run distribution of  $Y_1$  and  $Y_2$ . But this is the same as solving the problem

$$\min_{\theta} \{2c \text{ Prob (noncooperation)}\}.$$

The constitutional designer will therefore wish to minimize the probability of noncooperation or equivalently to maximize the stability of the political and social order.

To analyze the influence of  $\theta$  on social stability, note that neither party has an incentive to violate the constitution if the following condition holds:

$$(6) \quad Y_1 - C_1 < \theta(Y_1 + Y_2) \quad \text{and} \quad Y_2 - C_2 < (1 - \theta)(Y_1 + Y_2).$$

Let  $X(\theta) \equiv Y_1 - \theta(Y_1 + Y_2)$ . Then (6) can be expressed as  $-C_2 < X(\theta) < C_1$ , or, taking note of (2), as

$$(7) \quad -c < X(\theta) + \varepsilon < c.$$

When it is positive,  $X(\theta)$  is the redistributive tax individual 1 pays out of his income  $Y_1$ , so as to secure the constitutional outcome. This tax should

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7. For a discussion of the “veil of ignorance” assumption and related concepts see RAWLS (1971), BUCHANAN and TULLOCK (1962), BUCHANAN (1967), HARSANYI (1955). The assumption of constant marginal utility is introduced here to rule out some demand for redistribution which, for independent reasons, would typically emerge at the constitutional level when utility functions are concave. See STROTZ (1958) and SAMUELSON (1964).

8. Although the constitutional arrangement will act to pool the income risk, these risk-neutral agents do not value this function. In spite of this, the constitutional will favor those agents with riskier income streams to offset these agents’ greater propensity to defect.




FIGURE 2

*Incentives to Defect as a Function of Income.*

be compared with the cost to him of not cooperating, namely  $C_1 = c - \varepsilon$ , as given by (2). For the second individual,  $X > 0$  implies a redistributive subsidy under constitutional order over his income  $Y_2$ .<sup>9</sup>

The incentives of the two groups are best explained pictorially. Figure 2 illustrates the three regions implied by eq. (7). It is clear that *it is the rich that will tend to want to defect*. Holding  $\varepsilon$  constant, the richer a group is, or the poorer the *other* group is, the more likely the group is to defect from the constitutional agreement<sup>10</sup>. The problem that faces the constitutional framer is to choose  $\theta$  so as to maximize the weight that the stationary distribution of the vector  $(Y_1, Y_2, \varepsilon)$  assigns to the shaded area. Doing so will maximize the expected value of output in the long run.

It is possible, but unlikely, that the poor group may also occasionally want to defect. This possibility is shown in Figure 3 where it is assumed that  $\theta$  is substantially larger than  $1/2$ , perhaps because the first group has an unusually strong rent-seeking ability, so that  $\varepsilon$  is most of the time positive.

9. Current conditions alone – the current realizations of  $Y_i$  and  $C_i$  – determine if cooperation will prevail. This is because the model assumes that there are no costs of transition between the two regimes. It will be clear, however, that relaxing this simplifying assumption would not affect the main result of this paper which is that an increase in inequality will increase social instability.

10. The figure becomes symmetric around zero if  $\varepsilon = 0$  and if  $\theta = 1/2$ , with the two parallel lines taking on a  $45^\circ$  slope.




FIGURE 3

Suppose that we are at point  $A$ , where group 2 is the poorer one. Then a move from  $A$  to  $B$  represents a defection by this group that was relatively poorer before *and* after the defection. A move to  $B'$  represents a gain in absolute but a loss in relative income for the defecting group, while a move to  $B''$  represents a loss in absolute income for the defecting group. Our result that the rich will want to defect will only hold in a probabilistic sense.

The constitutional framer could raise welfare even further if he could index  $\theta$  on past realizations of the  $Y_i$  and  $C_i$ . Furthermore, he could eliminate defections *altogether* if he could index  $\theta$  on the current  $Y_i$  and  $C_i$ . Constitutions can be amended and this happens in practice, albeit rarely. Such “midstream” adjustments are costly, they take time for parties to agree on and determining their nature would just complicate the analysis without changing its main result, except in the case where constitutional laws can react even to current information. To simplify the analysis, then, we shall focus on the case where the constitutional adjustment costs are infinite, and where the constitutional rules are quite simple – a fixed sharing rule for total output. We think that the arguments we advanced at the end of the previous section serve to make this special case an interesting one <sup>11</sup>.

The constitutional problem, then, is to choose  $\theta$  to maximize the steady-state probability that the random redistributive tax (subsidy) stays within the limits described by (7). Letting  $w(\theta) \equiv X(\theta) + \varepsilon$ , the problem is to

11. Suppose, moreover, that the planner can index  $\theta$  on everything but the current realizations. Then in the i.i.d. case ( $\lambda_i = \rho = 0$ ), our solution for  $\theta$  is the same as the reactive solution because the conditional distribution of  $(Y_1, Y_2, \varepsilon)$  next period is the same as the stationary distribution of this vector. Thus our solution for  $\theta$  diverges substantially from the reactive one only if the  $\lambda_i$  or  $\rho$  are large.

maximize  $P \equiv \text{Prob} \{-c < w(\theta) < c\}$ . The stationary distribution  $w(\theta)$  is normal with mean

$$m = (\theta) \equiv \frac{(1 - \theta)a_1}{1 - \lambda_1} - \frac{\theta a_2}{1 - \lambda_2} + \frac{\bar{u}}{1 - \rho},$$

and variance

$$(8) \quad s^2(\theta) \equiv \frac{(1 - \theta)^2 \sigma_1^2}{1 - \lambda_1^2} + \frac{\theta^2 \sigma_2^2}{1 - \lambda_2^2} + \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 - \rho^2}.$$

As an expositional device we shall first confront the constitutional framer with two simpler problems. Consider first the influence of  $\theta$  on the mean only. On this sole account, and in view of the symmetry of the limits in (7),  $\theta$  should be set so as to make  $m(\theta) = 0$ . That value is

$$(9) \quad \theta_0 \equiv \frac{a_1/(1 - \lambda_1) + \bar{u}/(1 - \rho)}{a_1/(1 - \lambda_1) + a_2/(1 - \lambda_2)}.$$

Since the steady-state ‘‘direct production’’ position of individual  $i$  is  $a_i/(1 - \lambda_i)$ , we see that  $\theta_0$  assigns to individual 1 a share in total income which is, except for the term  $\bar{u}/(1 - \rho)$ , redistributively neutral. In fact, individual 1 would keep all that he can privately produce in the steady-state under peace. This ‘‘direct production’’ distribution is, however, adjusted by the term  $\bar{u}/(1 - \rho)$ . If,  $\bar{u} > 0$ , this term represents a redistributive premium added to individual 1’s share so as to compensate him for his noncooperative rent-seeking superiority – his greater threat-power, so to speak. Thus, the long-run determinants of the underlying ‘‘natural distribution’’ should therefore surface at the constitutional contract level.

Next, consider the influence of  $\theta$  only on the variability of the redistributive tax. According to (7), if we take account of the influence of  $\theta$  solely on  $s^2(\theta)$ , its optimal value should be set so as to reduce  $s^2(\theta)$  to a minimum. That value is

$$\bar{\theta} \equiv \frac{\sigma_1^2/(1 - \lambda_1^2)}{\sigma_2^2/(1 - \lambda_2^2) + \sigma_1^2/(1 - \lambda_1^2)}.$$

We observed in note 6 that, in a sense, the constitutional contract involves a ‘pooling of risks’ via the associated redistributive function. Suppose that individual 1’s output is subject to greater fluctuations so that its steady-state variance is greater than that of individual 2<sup>12</sup>. In this case, individual 1 should, other things equal, receive a comparatively higher share of post-constitutional income (pay a smaller redistributive tax). Political stability therefore requires that risky productive activities should command a premium in the division of post-constitutional social income.

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12. Since the steady-state variance of output of individual  $i$  is  $\sigma_i^2/(1 - \lambda_i^2)$ , this may come either from a greater variance of impulse shocks ( $\sigma_1 > \sigma_2$ ) and/or from a greater inertia or persistence in its propagation mechanism ( $\lambda_1 > \lambda_2$ ).

We now turn to the problem that the constitutional framer *actually* solves: choose  $\theta$  to maximize

$$P = F\left(\frac{c - m(\theta)}{s(\theta)}\right) - F\left(\frac{-c - m(\theta)}{s(\theta)}\right),$$

where  $F$  is the standard normal distribution. This expression is homogeneous of degree zero in  $c$ ,  $m$  and  $s$ , from which it follows that if the  $Y_i$  and  $C_i$  were to be scaled up by some multiple, the optimal  $\theta$  would be unchanged as it should be. The first-order condition is

$$(10) \quad \left[ F'\left(\frac{-c - m}{s}\right) - F'\left(\frac{c - m}{s}\right) \right] \frac{m'}{s} - \left[ F'\left(\frac{c - m}{s}\right) \left(\frac{c - m}{s^2}\right) + F'\left(\frac{-c - m}{s}\right) \left(\frac{c + m}{s^2}\right) \right] s' = 0.$$

The effects of  $\theta$  on the mean and the variance are in the first and the second term, respectively. As Part 1 of the Appendix shows, the first term is the derivative of a concave function of  $\theta$  which has a zero at  $\theta_0$ ; the second term is the derivative of a concave function with a zero at  $\bar{\theta}$ . This implies that the solution to (10),  $\theta^*$ , is between  $\theta_0$  and  $\bar{\theta}$ :

$$(11) \quad \theta_0 \leq \theta^* \leq \bar{\theta}, \quad \text{if } \theta_0 \leq \bar{\theta}, \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{\theta} \leq \theta^* \leq \theta_0, \quad \text{if } \bar{\theta} \leq \theta_0.$$

The main result on which we shall base our empirical work pertains to the case in which the constitutional agreement is made between two ex-ante equal groups. In this case the optimal constitution treats the two groups equally, in the sense that  $\theta = 1/2$ .

PROPOSITION 1: Let  $a_1 = a_2$ ,  $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2$ ,  $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2$  and  $\bar{u} = 0$ . Then  $\theta = 1/2$ .

*Proof:* Equation (8) shows that both  $m(\theta)$  and  $s(\theta)$  become symmetric  $\theta$  around the point  $\theta = 1/2$ . Indeed both  $\theta_0$  and  $\bar{\theta}$  are equal to  $1/2$  so that  $m(1/2) = 0$  and  $s(1/2)$  is at a minimum. Since  $F'(-c/s) = F'(c/s)$ , and since  $s'(1/2) = 0$ , eq. (10) holds at  $\theta = 1/2$ .  $\square$

The task now is convert this result into an empirically testable proposition. This result is contained in the main theorem.

THEOREM 1: Under the conditions assumed in Proposition 1, and if, in addition,  $\varepsilon = 0$ , then

- (a) A defection is accompanied by an increase in absolute income inequality,
- (b) A reversion to order is accompanied by a decrease in absolute income inequality.

*Proof:* Since the conditions of Proposition 1 are assumed,  $\theta = 1/2$ . But then  $\varepsilon = 0$  implies that (7) reads

$$(7') \quad |Y_1 - Y_2| < 2c.$$




FIGURE 4

*The case where  $\theta = 1/2$  and  $\varepsilon = 0$ .*

Hence stability prevails if and only if incomes differ by less than  $2c$ . Both (a) and (b) follow from this observation.  $\square$

We can represent this situation in Figure 4, where each point the shaded area involves a smaller absolute income difference than any point outside the shaded area.

To test this proposition we need data on absolute income differentials, which are not available. But movements in absolute income differentials for the most part go in the same direction as movements in *relative* income differentials, and the latter type of data are available.

## 4 Evidence From Major Constitutional Changes

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The analysis above identifies two types of constitutional innovations: Innovations leading to the emergence of constitutional order are likely to be Pareto-improving as agents tend to behave cooperatively. These would be associated with an increase in output as well as a decrease in the disparity of income distribution. Alternatively, breakdowns in constitutional order would be associated with a decrease in output and an increase in the disparity of income distribution. This predicted relationship between constitutional changes and income distribution is tested here.

The lack of data on income distribution for cross-country samples limited the size of our sample. In particular, testing for the consequences of a

constitutional change requires a measure of income distribution both before and after an observed period. Nevertheless, we were able to identify 79 ranges over periods of at least three years for which both beginning and ending period measures of income distribution for a given country were available. We then calculated the average annual percentage in income distribution over this period, as measured by the Gini coefficient <sup>13</sup>.

Constitutional changes were identified through **Constitutions of the Countries of the World**. This source gave detailed descriptions of all innovations in national legal regimes over the sample period. For the sample of 79 in our data set, we identified 28 “major” constitutional changes. In the spirit of the analysis above, a constitutional change was only deemed major if it led to a fundamental change in the conduct of government or in civil rights. Appendix 1 lists the ranges which were characterized as having no major constitutional changes. This sample serves as the control group for our analysis of the impact of major constitutional changes.

Of the 28 major constitutional changes, we identify 17 as being “disruptive” in nature. These include sample periods from a heterogeneous group of nations, including Bangladesh, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Guatemala, Hungary, India, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Thailand. These nations experienced either military coups, severe reductions in civil rights, the imposition of martial law or the suspension of constitutional rights during declarations of emergency. In the spirit of the model above, we would characterize these changes as indicating a movement from the cooperative core to the Pareto-inferior non-cooperative equilibrium. Appendix 2 lists the ranges which include disruptive constitutional changes and briefly lists the major events in each range.

In addition, we identified 11 periods as containing “non-disruptive” constitutional changes. These include ranges from a diverse set of nations as well, including Brazil, China, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. These periods include changes which curtail monarchy power in favor of democracy, modernization of existing constitutions, extensive post-dictatorship constitutional reforms, and relatively smooth transitions in the control of production. Appendix 2 also lists the ranges which include non-disruptive constitutional changes and the major events in each range.

As a group, however, the sample of nations experiencing non-disruptive constitutional changes appears to be more heterogeneous and difficult to characterize than its clearly disruptive counterpart. While the Malaysian and Spanish changes can be considered movements toward cooperation, we would not predict a major impact from the adoption of an entirely new constitution by the Netherlands, since the new regime left almost all of the features of existing institutions intact. In addition, the Korean

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13. The Gini coefficient measures constructed were found to be highly correlated with other measures of income distribution that have been used in the literature, for example, the share of the top 20% used by PERSON and TABELLINI (1991).

experience from 1976 through 1988 included a Presidential assassination and a brief subsequent period of martial law, although it is characterized as “non-disruptive” because the primary regime changes over the period were the liberalizations subsequent to this turbulent episode. Due to the heterogeneity prevalent in this sample, we would not expect to find as strong a relationship between the changes identified in this group and their impact on the distribution of income as for the first group.

The results of our empirical study are summarized in Table 1. We divide the sample into three sub-samples, depending on the presence of a major constitutional change over the sample period, and whether that change was disruptive or non-disruptive. We then determine whether the means of the sub-samples are statistically distinct at a 5 percent confidence level.

TABLE 1

*Differences in Annual Changes in Income Distribution by Type of Constitutional Change*

Sample	Constitutional Change	Mean Annual Percentage		
		Change in Gini Coefficient	# of Obs.	Variance
A	None	-0.31%/yr	51	0.009
B	Disruptive	2.37%/yr	17	0.0023
C	Non-Disruptive	-0.72%/yr	11	0.00009

Test	Degrees of Freedom	t .025	95% Confidence Interval
$\mu_B - \mu_A$	21	2.080	0.0268 ± 0.0259*
$\mu_C - \mu_A$	51	2.010	-0.0041 ± 0.0106
$\mu_B - \mu_C$	18	2.101	0.0296 ± 0.0254*

\* Indicates significantly different from 0 at a 5% confidence level.

The mean annual percentage change in Gini coefficient over the 51 nations in the control group for which no major constitutional changes were observed was -0.31% per year. On the other hand, for the 17 identified disruptive constitutional changes, the mean annual change in the Gini coefficient over their respective sample periods was +2.37% per year. The difference in means between these two groups was found to be statistically significant at a 5% confidence level.

Alternatively, the mean annual percentage change in the Gini coefficient for the group of “non-disruptive” constitutional changes was -0.72% per year. While this value is less than that for the control group at -0.31% per year, as would be predicted by our theory, the difference is not significant at a 5 percent confidence level.

Finally, we examine whether the sample containing disruptive constitutional changes is statistically significantly different than that containing non-disruptive constitutional changes, as would also be predicted by our theory. As we show in Table 1, despite the relatively small size

of the samples in this comparison, the difference in changes in inequality between nations experiencing disruptive and non-disruptive constitutional changes is indeed significant at a 5 percent confidence level. This provides further support for the theory above.

Overall, the empirical results tend to support the above theory. While the sample range for which no constitutional changes were observed showed a movement towards greater equality in income distribution, those for which disruptive constitutional change was observed showed a movement towards greater skewness in income distribution. Moreover, the difference between these two groups was statistically significant at a five percent confidence level. However, the results for the “non-disruptive” group of constitutional changes was less conclusive. Non-disruptive changes were found to lead to greater movements toward equality than no constitutional changes, as would be predicted by our theory, but not at a statistically significant level. Nevertheless, the difference between the two samples experiencing major constitutional changes was in accordance with the theory and significant at a five percent confidence level.

A possible difficulty with the comparability of these sample ranges across countries is that they stem from different time periods because of the infrequency of availability of income distribution data. This could be a problem if there was a time trend in income distribution which had an independent effect on the annual percentage changes in income distribution over time. In particular, it is often suggested that incomes have a tendency to become less skewed over time. Indeed, one can see from our sample with no major constitutional changes that a weak negative relationship between income distributions and time does exist. Moreover, such a relationship also exists, although weakly, for the three samples together.

We therefore examine the robustness of our results to accounting for differences in the time from which the samples were taken. Table 2 displays the results of a least-squares regression of the mean percentage change per year in Gini coefficient on country dummies representing the presence of a disruptive or a non-disruptive constitutional change over the period. Model 1 represents the basic results, which are identical to those we found above. Country ranges listed as including disruptive constitutional changes have relatively higher mean annual percentage increases in Gini coefficients at a 1 percent confidence level. Also in keeping with our results above, country ranges listed as including non-disruptive constitutional changes have relative lower mean annual percentage increases in Gini coefficients over the sample period, but not at statistically significant levels.

Model 2 then examines the impact of accounting for the timing of samples by including a variable representing the mid-year from each sample range. A positive coefficient on this variable would indicate that ranges occurring later in time had higher percentage increases in Gini coefficients than those occurring earlier, holding all else constant. However, our results show that this variable is highly insignificant. More importantly, it has a very negligible impact on the variables of interest in our regression. Both the coefficient estimates and confidence intervals of the other variables are almost entirely unaffected by the inclusion of the time variable. Consequently, we conclude that time trends do not play an important role in determining the annual percentage changes in income.

TABLE 2

**Robustness Test for Influence of Date of Range**Dependent Variable: Mean Annual % $\Delta$  in Gini Coefficient Over Range

	Constant	Disruptive	Non-Disruptive	Mid-Year	$n$	$R^2$	$F$ -Statistic
Model 1	-0.0375 (0.0578)	0.0270** (0.0095)	-0.0026 (0.0112)	— —	79	0.105	4.441*
Model 2	-0.0375 (0.0578)	0.0256** (0.0098)	-0.0037 (0.0114)	0.0004 (0.0007)	79	0.109	3.05*

\* Indicates significantly different from 0 at a 5% confidence level

\*\* Indicates significantly different from 0 at a 1% confidence level

## 5 Further Implications of the Model

We now state some further propositions, some of which are proved in the Appendix. These propositions describe how changes in some of the model's parameters affect the nature of the optimal constitution, and the degree of political stability. We were not able test these propositions with the data that we now have. The first two propositions help to establish some intuition about the nature of the optimal solution.

| PROPOSITION 2: If  $a_1 = a_2 = 0$ , then  $\theta^* = \bar{\theta}$ .

In this case  $m(\theta)$  does not depend on  $\theta$ , so that the only relevant consideration in choosing  $\theta$  should therefore be cyclical in character. Specifically, it should minimize the variability of the tax, and this occurs at  $\bar{\theta}$ .

| PROPOSITION 3: If  $\sigma_1^2 = \sigma_2^2 = 0$ , then  $\theta^* = \theta_0$ .

This is the case where output under peace is deterministic, and  $\theta$  can not affect  $s^2(\theta)$ . Only its influence on  $m(\theta)$  matters, and here the optimal solution is  $\theta_0$ .

The next several propositions deal with how the stability of the social order depends on exogenous circumstances. The first result concerns an exogenous decrease in both agents' rent-seeking ability, *i.e.*, a rise in  $C$ . The result is an immediate application of the envelope theorem:

| PROPOSITION 4:

$$\left| \frac{\partial P}{\partial C} = \frac{1}{s} \left[ F' \left( \frac{c-m}{s} \right) + F' \left( \frac{-c-m}{s} \right) \right] \right| > 0.$$

This is what one would have expected since a rise in  $C$  represents a reduction in the opportunity cost of social order for both individuals.

Fluctuations in the  $Y_i$  and in the  $C_i$  are the cause of instability, and increases in the amplitude of their fluctuations would be expected to destabilize the social order more frequently. This is indeed true:

| PROPOSITION 5:  $\partial P/\partial\sigma_i < 0$  for  $i = 1, 2, \varepsilon$ .

Technically this result follows because  $P$  is decreasing in  $s(\theta)$  and the latter is an increasing function of the  $\sigma_i$ . A higher  $\sigma_1$  or  $\sigma_2$  imply greater inequality in incomes in the steady state distribution, and also imply greater cyclical instability in incomes. Thus we have established a type of causality that runs from income inequality and cyclical income instability on the one hand to political instability on the other.

The next proposition deals with the effects that an increase in inequality between the average incomes of the two parties will have on the stability of the social order. The results will show, quite consistently, that increases in inequality are destabilizing. Put differently, a social mechanism that tries to induce cooperation by promising shares ( $\theta$  and  $1 - \theta$ ) of total output to the participants will find it harder to do so when those participants are unequal. The possible dimensions of inequality are several, and we shall go through them case by case.

| PROPOSITION 6: If  $\theta_0 > \bar{\theta}$ ,  $\partial P/\partial a_1 < 0$  and  $\partial P/\partial a_2 > 0$ .  
If  $\theta_0 < \bar{\theta}$ ,  $\partial P/\partial a_1 > 0$  and  $\partial P/\partial a_2 < 0$ .

This result is easiest to interpret when  $\sigma_1 = \sigma_2$ ,  $\lambda_1 = \lambda_2$  (so that  $\bar{\theta} = 1/2$ , and so that the two agents' incomes are equally noisy), and  $\bar{u} = 0$ . Then if at the constitutional agreement stage individual 1 is in a relatively stronger position in terms of productivity ( $a_1 > a_2$ ) so that  $\theta_0 > \bar{\theta}$ , then a strengthening of this superiority is destabilizing. In other words, if the groups' income risk and their predatory strength are equal, then income inequality is destabilizing. A similar result applies to changes in a group's predatory strength:

| PROPOSITION 7: If  $\theta_0 > \bar{\theta}$ ,  $\partial P/\partial \bar{u} < 0$ .  
If  $\theta_0 < \bar{\theta}$ ,  $\partial P/\partial \bar{u} > 0$ .

If he already benefits from a relatively stronger position in terms of productivity, an increase in an individuals' rent-seeking ability is destabilizing. The intuition is the same as that of Proposition 6.

When it comes to the effect on stability of changes in the persistence parameters  $\lambda_1$ ,  $\lambda_2$ , or  $\rho$ , two effects are at work. First, an increase in each parameter raises the variance of  $w$  and therefore destabilizes the social order. Second, however, each parameter also affects the mean of steady-state output. Here the situation is similar to the one analyzed in Proposition 6 and 7. If  $\theta_0 > \bar{\theta}$ , so that individual 1 initially enjoys a superiority of sorts, an increase in  $\lambda_1$  or  $\rho$  or a reduction in  $\lambda_2$ , as it further strengthens his steady-state relative claims on output, represents a destabilizing factor. If  $\theta_0 < \bar{\theta}$ , the converse applies. Sometimes these two effects work in opposite directions, but the following cases produce unambiguous results:

PROPOSITION 8: If  $\theta_0 > \bar{\theta}$ ,  $\partial P/\partial \lambda_1 < 0$  and  $\partial P/\partial \rho < 0$ .  
If  $\theta_0 < \bar{\theta}$ ,  $\partial P/\partial \rho_2 < 0$ .

All these comparative statics results apply when parameters are varied at the time (or prior to the time) that the constitution is being designed. But the effects that these parameter changes have on  $P$ , as described in the last five propositions, apply in a broader sense as well: the partial derivatives of  $P$  with respect to the parameters were all calculated by holding  $\theta$  fixed – the envelope theorem allows one to do that at the optimal  $\theta$ . These propositions therefore do tell us the effect that parameter changes would have on the stability of the social order, even if such parameter changes were to occur after the constitution has been designed.

## 6 Summary and Conclusions

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In this contractarian framework, constitutional order emerges as a Pareto improvement over an alternative state where individuals waste resources. When shocks are present, Pareto dominance of the constitutional order becomes an uncertain outcome. In such an environment, constitutional framers, acting under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, will try maximize post-constitutional political stability or, equivalently, to minimize the probability of noncooperation. We have shown that the optimal constitution chosen in this context should reflect long-run attributes of the underlying natural distribution of social income. These deeper parameters should surface at the constitutional level.

We also noted that the constitutional contract typically creates, through its redistributive function, an interdependence between individual pay-offs. In a stochastic framework this interdependence affects the variability of these pay-offs. Account should therefore be taken of this influence on the probability of war.

Having determined the nature of the optimal constitution, we examined how political stability would depend on exogenous events. An increase in the cost of noncooperation or a decrease in the variability of shocks affecting productivity are stabilizing. At the same time, events which strengthen an already existing relative advantage of one individual's income position over the other, reduce stability. Events which increase the persistence or the inertia of the evolutionary processes governing productivity or rent-seeking attributes, are detrimental to stability if they impinge on the individual who already enjoys a relative advantage.

The message of this paper is that if constitutions are constrained to provide various groups with fixed shares of the total economic pie, they are more likely to survive if the groups in question are roughly similar in their economic and noneconomic capacities. In this respect our message is the same as that of BENHABIB and RUSTICHINI [1991] and PERSSON and

TABELLINI [1991] who, for very different reasons, also find that inequality is detrimental to the welfare of the society at large.

The distinctive implication of the model is that constitutional disruptions should be accompanied by increases in inequality, while reversions to order should be accompanied by decreases in inequality. This implication was confirmed in the sample of major constitutional changes that we had available.

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## APPENDIX 1

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● **Part 1:** This part substantiates the claims made following equation (10) of the text.

From (11), let  $H(\theta) \equiv \left[ F' \left( \frac{-c - m(\theta)}{s(\theta)} \right) - F' \left( \frac{c - m(\theta)}{s(\theta)} \right) \right] \frac{m'(\theta)}{s(\theta)}$ . To show that  $H$  is the derivative of a concave function in  $\theta$ , note that  $m'(\theta) = -\frac{a_1}{1 - \lambda_1} - \frac{a_2}{1 - \lambda_2} < 0$ . And since  $c > 0$ ,

$$(1A) \quad F' \left( \frac{-c - m}{s} \right) \geq F' \left( \frac{c - m}{s} \right) \quad \text{as } m \geq 0.$$

Therefore,  $H \geq 0$  as  $m \geq 0$  or, from (13), (9) and since  $m' < 0$ , we have  $H \geq 0$  as  $\theta \geq \bar{\theta}$ . Thus, the function  $H(\theta)$  crosses the abscissa from above which implies that it is the derivative of a concave function in  $\theta$ . Next, let

$$J(\theta) = \left[ F' \left( \frac{c - m(\theta)}{s(\theta)} \right) \left( \frac{c - m(\theta)}{s^2(\theta)} \right) + F' \left( \frac{-c - m(\theta)}{s(\theta)} \right) \left( \frac{c + m(\theta)}{s^2(\theta)} \right) \right] s'(\theta).$$

The term in square brackets is positive since  $-c \leq m \leq c$ . On the other hand,  $s' = \partial s / \partial \theta = (1/s)[\theta \sigma_2^2 / (1 - \lambda_2^2) - (1 - \theta) \sigma_1^2 / (1 - \lambda_1^2)]$ , so that,  $s' = \geq 0$  as  $\theta \geq \bar{\theta}$ . Therefore  $J \geq 0$  as  $\theta \geq \bar{\theta}$  which implies that  $J(\theta)$  is the derivative of a concave function on  $\theta$ .

● **Part 2:** This part proves propositions 6-8.

PROPOSITION 6:

(2A)

$$\partial P / \partial a_i = (1/s) \left[ -F' \left( \frac{c - m}{s} \right) + F' \left( \frac{-c - m}{s} \right) \right] (\partial m / \partial a_i) \quad i = 1, 2$$

where  $\partial m / \partial a_i = (1 - \theta) / (1 - \lambda_1)$ , and  $\partial m / \partial a_2 = (-\theta) / (1 - \lambda_2)$ . Now using (1A), the term in square brackets in (2A) is negative iff  $m > 0$ , i.e., iff  $\theta^* < \theta_0$ , and therefore, in view of (12), iff  $\bar{\theta} < \theta_0$ .

PROPOSITION 7:

$$\partial P / \partial \bar{u} = (1/s) \left[ -F' \left( \frac{c - m}{s} \right) + F' \left( \frac{-c - m}{s} \right) \right] (\partial m / \partial \bar{u}).$$

But,  $\partial m / \partial \bar{u} = (1 - \rho)^{-1}$ . Therefore, again using (1A) and (12),  $\partial P / \partial \bar{u} > 0$  iff  $\bar{\theta} < \theta_0$ . Otherwise,  $\partial P / \partial \bar{u} < 0$ .

PROPOSITION 8: We have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda_1} &= A \frac{(1 - \theta) a_1}{(1 - \lambda_1)^2} + B \frac{(1 - \theta)^2 \sigma_1^2 2 \lambda_1}{(1 - \lambda_1^2)^2}, \\ \frac{\partial P}{\partial \lambda_2} &= A \frac{(-\theta) a_2}{(1 - \lambda_2)^2} + B \frac{\theta^2 \sigma_2^2 2 \lambda_2}{(1 - \lambda_2^2)^2}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial \rho} = A \frac{\bar{u}}{(1 - \rho)^2} + B \frac{2\sigma_\varepsilon^2 \rho}{(1 - \rho^2)^2},$$

where

$$A = \frac{1}{s} \left[ -F' \left( \frac{c - m}{s} \right) + F' \left( \frac{-c - m}{s} \right) \right],$$

and

$$B = \left[ -F' \left( \frac{c - m}{s^2} \right) \frac{c - m}{s^2} + F' \left( \frac{-c - m}{s} \right) \left( \frac{-c - m}{s^2} \right) \right].$$

Each derivative consists of two terms. In each case the second term (the effect on the variance) is, in view of the discussion in part 1 of this Appendix, unambiguously negative. For reasons discussed above, the sign of the first term depends, however, on whether  $\bar{\theta} < \theta_0$ , or  $\bar{\theta} > \theta_0$  in which case it is negative or positive, respectively.

## APPENDIX 2

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### Description of Country Ranges

*Ranges Exhibiting No Major Changes*

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Country	Sample Range	Country	Sample Range
Australia	75-85	Italy	77-86
Australia	66-75	Italy	69-77
Bangladesh	76-82	Japan	69-79
Brazil	72-83	Kenya	83-92
Canada	81-87	Kenya	76-83
Canada	77-81	Malaysia	70-73
Canada	69-77	Mexico	77-84
Chile	89-92	Morocco	85-91
Colombia	88-91	Nepal	77-85
Costa Rica	86-89	Netherlands	77-81
Costa Rica	71-86	Netherlands	67-77
Cote d'Ivoire	85-88	Norway	79-82
Denmark	76-81	Norway	70-79
Finland	77-81	Panama	70-73
France	79-89	Peru	72-85
France	75-79	Spain	81-88
France	70-75	Sri Lanka	86-90
Germany	84-88	Sweden	72-81
Germany	78-84	Switzerland	78-82
Germany	74-78	United Kingdom	79-88
Honduras	67-89	United Kingdom	73-79
India	83-90	United States	80-85
India	75-83	United States	72- 80
Indonesia	87-90	Venezuela	70-87
Indonesia	76-87	Yugoslavia	78-87
Indonesia	73-76		

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*Ranges Exhibiting Disruptive Changes*

Country	Years	Major Events
Bangladesh	73-76	A military coup occurred in 1975 which brought Major Gen. Zia ur-Rahman into power.
Bangladesh	82-86	A bloodless military coup occurred in 1982 resulting in martial law. Lt. Gen. Ershad ejected President Sattar.
Bangladesh	86-89	Passage of Constitution Act (Seventh Amendment) which Claimed to restore constitution but effectively protected the legality of President Ershad's decrees under martial law.
Chile	68-89	In 1973, the civilian government was ousted by military coup and Gen. Pinochet took over the presidency. In 1980, a new constitution was approved that gave specific transitional provisions for return to civilian constitutional government over the same eight year period. On Oct 5, 1988, in a constitutionally mandated plebiscite, voters rejected Pinochet.
China	86-90	Deng Xiaoping resigned from the politburo in 1987 and the military commission in 1989. Student demonstrations demanding reforms began in April 1989 and culminated in the Tiananmen Square sit-in. Martial law was imposed from May 1989 to Jan.1990, and the pace of reform was slowed.
Czech Republic	89-92	In 1989, Communist Party overthrown in "velvet Revolution". In 1992, Czechoslovakia was split. Czech National Council adopted a new constitution. Assets of Czechoslovak Federation divided two to one in favor of Czechs. Citizens also divided on basis of nationality laws. Many new Slovaks applied for Czech citizenship.
Guatemala	79-89	In 1982, a military coup headed by General Rios Montt overthrew the government. In 1983, Rios Montt was overthrown by Gen. Oscar Victores. Period was marked by large level of political violence. New constitution passed in 1985 bringing greater human rights guarantees. However, death squad activity quickly resumed.
Hungary	83-89	In 1988, end of one-party state with approval of new constitution by the National Assembly. Party congress transformed into Hungarian Socialist party.
India	65-75	In 1971, discretionary power of Parliament to amend any part of constitution was increased. This change was designed to facilitate amendments to civil rights laws, which had previously been prohibited. In 1975, President Ali declares national emergency, granting Prime Minister Gandhi power to do whatever she considered "best" for the country for at least six months.
Philippines	70-85	In 1972, President Marcos declares martial law. In 1973 Marcos proclaimed the ratification of a new constitution based on the parliamentary system, with himself as both president and prime minister. Martial law was lifted in 1981.
Poland	87-92	In 1989, the Solidarity trade union was restored to legal status and allowed to field candidates in a partially free election. The Communist Party was unable to form a government and Solidarity leader Mazowiecki formed the first non-communist government in 40 years. Solidarity itself experienced turmoil in 1990. In 1992, constitutional amendments enhanced the power of the President and Prime Minister.

Country	Years	Major Events
Russia	91-94	The U.S.S.R. ceased to exist in 1991 after a failed coup attempt brought an end of the Communist Party. In 1993, Yeltsin dissolved Parliament, leading to armed conflict. A new constitution was also adopted that year which gives great power to the president.
Slovakia	89-92	In 1989, Communist Party overthrown in “velvet Revolution”. In 1992, Czechoslovakia was split as the Slovak National Council declared sovereignty and the Slovak National Council adopted a Constitution for an independent Slovakia. Assets of Czechoslovak Federation divided two to one in favor of Czechs. Citizens also divided on basis of nationality laws. Many new Slovaks applied for Czech citizenship.
Sri Lanka	69-81	In 1972, a new constitution was passed. In 1978, this constitution was repealed and a new constitution was passed. From 1971-1977 the country was in a state of national emergency.
Sri Lanka	81-85	This period included numerous declarations of states of emergency which entailed suspensions of constitutional rights in response to ethnic military conflict.
Tanzania	69-91	Early 1970’s were marked by political violence, particularly on island of Zanzibar, which was demanding enhanced independence. In 1977, a new constitution was approved for the United Republic. A separate constitution for Zanzibar was approved in 1979.
Thailand	76-88	In 1977, a military coup occurred, handing power to Gen. Kriangsak Chomanand.

### *Ranges Exhibiting Non-Disruptive Changes*

Country	Years	Major Events
Brazil	83-89	In 1985, a civilian government was restored, replacing the government headed by the armed forces that came into power in 1964. In 1988, Brazil's eighth constitution was promulgated, providing for new public freedoms.
China	81-86	In 1983, Deng Xiaoping became head of the State Military Commission. The entire period was marked by slow reforms towards a more market-oriented economy.
Korea	76-88	In Oct. 1979, Pres. Park was assassinated. This was followed by a brief period of martial law, after which a new constitution was approved. In 1987 a constitutional reform program was undertaken which restored democratic institutions and basic civil rights. The power of the National Assembly was also strengthened.
Malaysia	73-87	The constitution Act of 1983 extensively revised constitution. Among revisions was a curtailment of power of monarchy in favor of elected officials. It was partially repealed in 1984.
Netherlands	81-88	In 1983, a new constitution was adopted which left the basic institutional structure of the nation relatively intact. The only changes were that the document was modernized and highlighted civil rights.
Pakistan	84-91	Martial law was lifted in 1985, as the constitution was amended to extend the powers of the President. In 1990, The President accused the government of corruption and undermining the constitution, dismissed Prime Minister Bhutto and declared a state of emergency.
Panama	73-89	The United States backed a number of coup attempts in 1988 and 1989, finally invading the nation in 1989 and overthrowing Gen. Noriega.
Philippines	85-88	In 1986, a strong public outcry against parliament's proclamation of Marcos as president resulted in Corazon Aquino assuming the presidency. In 1987, a new constitution was drafted by referendum.
Spain	74-81	In 1978, a new constitution came into effect subsequent to the death of Gen. Francisco Franco. It declared that Spain was a constitutional monarchy.
Yugoslavia	73-78	In 1974 a new constitution was drafted in a bid to reaffirm party authority. It vested President Tito with lifetime presidency.
Zambia	76-91	In Aug.1991, the constitution was changed to allow the reintroduction of a multiparty system.